General, A historic example of a nationwide military operational support to civilian authorities involving United States Army Air Corps leaders and aviators - some who became founding leaders of a future Eighth Air Force.

9 February 1934, Executive Order #6591: This order issued by President Franklin D. Roosevelt directed the Army Air Corps to temporarily deliver air mail nationwide to allow the federal government time to resolve an issue with commercial air mail contractors.

Executive Order #6591: This order - formal name of the Army Air Corps Mail Operations (AACMO) - commenced on 19 February 1934 with military aviators delivering air mail nationwide during all types of weather and flying conditions. Army Air Corps leaders, air planners, and especially the military aviators and ground crews leaned many valuable lessons in conducting aerial operations in this nationwide effort but before the AACMO ended on 1 June 1934 - the Army Air Corps would pay a price.

Heritage Note: Per the Air Service Newsletter dated 4 January 1919, the then U.S. Army Air Service had collaborated with the U.S. Postal Service to establish inaugural air mail routes within the United States. This unique air operation was conducted from 15 May to 12 August 1918. The U.S. Army aviator of this early air mail collaboration was Colonel Henry "Hap" Arnold (future Commanding General of the United States Army Air Forces in World War II).

Rest of the Story: Prior to issue of Executive Order #6591; officials of the U.S. Post Office had consulted with senior leaders of the Army Air Corps to determine if mail could be hauled for a temporary time. On 10 February, Major General Benjamin Foulois, the Chief of the Army Air Corps; agreed to support air mail operations to commence on 19 February. The designated commander for AACMO once implemented would be Brigadier General Oscar Westover supported by a small staff.

Notwithstanding the "can do" attitude of senior Army Air Corps leaders, air mail delivery would require flights at night and in bad weather. As well open air, no canopy flight compartment of the airplanes to be used were not equipped with blind flying instruments or even radios. The Air Corps had ten days to prepare for this air mail carrying mission. Understanding these challenges, the Air Corps leadership directed artificial horizons, gyro compasses, and radios be installed in the aircraft designated to carry the mail. However, many of these flight instruments were not readily available and when they were, aircraft mechanics unfamiliar with these technical instruments sometimes installed them incorrectly.

Between 10 and 19 February, the senior leaders and staff of the Air Corps had to arrange hangar and office space along the planned air routes, arrange for refueling, assign pilots and maintenance personnel, and arrange for lodging. At several civilian airfields to be utilized, Air Corps mechanics arrived but their tools to work on aircraft did not arrive. Not every civilian airfield around the United States had nearby lodging causing many ground crews to be lodged in hangars. And the 14 varieties of military aircraft to carry the mail had varying lift capabilities. Some small pursuit (fighter) aircraft could only carry 25 pounds of bagged mail with other aircraft like the Martin B-10 bomber carrying one ton of mail items. To execute the AACMO mission, some 250 Air Corps pilots, nearly 350 enlisted personnel, and 250 aircraft participated.

Air Corps leaders and air planners implemented AACMO originally with 17 air routes in three operational zones - Eastern (with nine air routes), Central (with four) and Western (with four) - covering the Continental United States with total air mileage being 13,294. However, when daily trips are considered, the total air miles flown each day became 40,630.

First Flying Week of AACMO: The winter months of 1934 experienced severe weather conditions that directly impacted nationwide air operations. A gigantic blizzard beginning in the Rocky Mountains moved east and disrupted the first day of air mail delivery operations. Several subsequent blizzards impacted the nation during February 1934. Military aircraft for the air mail mission parked on airfield ramps could not be started when their engine oil congealed. Carburetor icing shut down engines in mid-flight and conditions of fog and dense clouds caused pilot disorientation. During this first week of air mail operations, six Army Corps flyers were killed in aircraft crashes.

During the period of 10 to 19 March 1934, AACMO was suspended to allow the entire air mail enterprise to reorganize with this effort influenced by lessons learned and the loss up to this time of nine pilots due to crash accidents. Most of the accidents were the result of bad weather especially in the month of February and the lack of instruments inside Army aircraft to allow night flying. The result of this deliberate reorganization resulted in rearranging air routes thus reducing the total number of air routes, reduction of flying schedules (air mileage reduced to 25,622) as well as equipment overhauls.

The Army Air Corps Newsletter dated January 1935, reflected on the AACMO air operations. Military aviators had moved 779,389 pounds of mail and flew 1,590,155 air miles with scheduled trips totaling 12,897.44 flying hours. However, these operational statistics also included 66 accidents and hard landings, but more critically the lost of 12 Air Corps pilots.

The Baker Board: This continental-sized air operations by the Army Air Corps resulted in several positive ripple effects which included an increase in funding for the Air Corps and upgrades in aircraft technology. Upgraded aviation technology included the installation of in-plane directional gyroscopes, artificial horizons, and radio transceivers. Subsequently, the Baker Board - headed by former Secretary of War Newton D. Baker - formally examined the lessons learned during AACMO air operations. The resulting Baker Board report recommended the creation of a central aerial strike force that reinforced the recommendation of the earlier 1933 Hugh A. Drum Board to create a "General Headquarters - Air Force" a limited step towards an Air Force independent from the United States Army. (Historian's Note: General Headquarters Air Force was subsequently activated by the War Department on 1 March 1935.)

Civil Aviation: The air operations implementing AACMO had applications for civil aviation. These applications influenced the creation of a nationwide air control system, more federal involvement in general aviation with the creation of the Federal Aviation Commission to study national aviation policy, and a change in business models by commercial air carriers. This corporate change entailed a move towards more fare-paying passengers as the major source of revenue and less dependence on air mail delivery contracts.

Connections to a future Eighth Air Force: Army Air commanders, air planners, and pilots who participated in AACMO gained valuable experience in conducting a continental-size air enterprise. Many became senior air leaders in World War II in all theaters of operations.

Of the three continental AACMO zones only the Westen Zone under the command of Colonel "Hap" Arnold did not lose a single pilot conducting its air mail operations. For the future, Eighth Air Force - Major Carl Spaatz was the AACMO air operations officer and Ira Eaker, Frank Armstrong, Curtis LeMay, and Bernie Lay, Jr. participated either as an officer-in-charge or flew a specific air route with all eventually becoming founding leaders and innovators for both VIII Bomber Command and the Eighth Air Force as American participation in the air war over Europe in World War II began in early 1942.

Heritage Note: On 9 December 1964, at the 85th birthday for General (retired) Benjamin Fouilois, the AACMO air mail operations were spoken about by General (retired) Ira C. Eaker who had been the officer-in-charge of the San Diego to Salt Lake City air mail route in 1934. General Eaker noted that these air mail operations was, "the best possible training for those who were to lead the Air Forces in World War II." General Foulois replied: "If I had it all to do over I would take the same position again. I would hope that I could have the same able commanders and brave pilots with me again, although I would wish for better planes, engines, instruments, and airways aids - and a little more time to get ready." (Source: Kevin L. Cook, Military History Quarterly, Spring 2008)